Japan’s history is full of moments when the elites rallied around a dramatic shift in strategy. In 1868, its leaders ditched hundreds of years of feudalism in response to the threat of western colonialism. In 1945, they abandoned the pursuit of“ greatness” via military means and set diligently about the task of achieving economic prosperity. Now, after 15 years of deflation, Japan’s leadership has dramatically reversed course again by going hell for leather for inflation. In strategic terms, the sudden shift is reminiscent of the notorious attack on Pearl Harbor. 在日本历史上，精英阶层团结一致大幅改变战略立场的时刻比比皆是。 1868年，日本领导人为应对西方殖民主义的威胁，抛弃了奉行数百年之久的封建主义。 1945年，日本领导人放弃了利用武力来追求“伟大”的做法，转而致力于实现经济繁荣的使命。今天，在国民经济经历了 15年通缩之后，日本领导人再次大幅转向，开始全力推行通胀政策。就战略而言，这种突然转向不由得让人想起臭名昭著的偷袭珍珠港行动。
Readers may consider the comparison to be in poor taste. Precious lives will not be lost as a result of an expansion of the monetary base, however dire the warnings from alarmists who say it will lead to hyperinflationary ruin. Yet there are interesting parallels. By 1941, Japan’s war planners thought conflict with the US was inevitable. In July that year, Washington had imposed an oil embargo on Japan in response to its invasion of French Indochina. Tokyo decided it needed to grab control of oil in the Dutch East Indies, now Indonesia– an assault that, it guessed, would inevitably draw the US into the war. In other words, conflict with Washington was coming. Better to pre-empt it in the hope of gaining significant strategic advantage through a surprise attack. 读者可能会认为，这种类比并不得体。货币基础的扩张并不会让人们丧失宝贵的生命，无论那些认为这种扩张将导致恶性通胀的人说得多么危言耸听。但二者确有一些有趣的相似之处。 1941年时，日本的战争策划者认为与美国发生冲突是不可避免的。当年 7月，美国政府为应对日本入侵法属印度支那，宣布对日本实施石油禁运。日本政府认定，有必要把荷属东印度群岛（如今的印尼）的石油控制在手里。它推测，如果对荷属东印度群岛发动袭击，将不可避免地把美国拖入战争。换言之，与美国的冲突很快就会到来。日本认为最好先发制人，以期通过偷袭来获得重大的战略优势。
Something of the same calculation is going on when it comes to inflation. The logic goes a bit like this: Japan’s current fiscal position is unsustainable; you cannot borrow half of what you spend indefinitely, particularly when your working population– and thus your likely tax base– is going to shrink indefinitely; Japan’s population, currently 127 m, will fall to 108 m by 2050. 在某种程度上，通胀政策有着同样的考虑。这里面的逻辑似乎是这样的：日本当前的财政状况是不可持续的；不可能永远靠举债来维持一半的支出，尤其是在劳动力人口（也就是潜在税基）无限萎缩的情况下；日本目前的总人口为 1.27亿，到 2050年时将降至 1.08亿。
Thus some sort of debt crunch is coming. With more than 90 per cent of debt held internally, however, future governments are unlikely to default outright. Far more plausibly, they will resort to the printing presses. And if the endgame is inflation anyway, surely it is better to get the boot in first. As with Pearl Harbor, the hope is that by beating the enemy to the punch, one stands a chance of gaining the upper hand. 如此一来，就会导致某种形式的债务危机。但鉴于日本逾 90%的国债是由国内民众持有的，未来的日本政府不太可能采取显性的违约。更有可能的是，他们会求助于印钞机。如果不管怎样结局都是通胀，那么显然还是尽早进入通胀为好。就珍珠港事件而言，日本人希望的是，若能先发制人，就有机会占据上风。
Some critics of reflation say it will work too well. The outcome, they predict, will be capital flight, yen collapse and rampant inflation. That is conceivable, though far from inevitable. If the Bank of Japan can spirit inflation from deflation, it stands a decent chance of being able to control it. Other critics say it will not work at all. Their argument is that Japan has been aggressively printing money for years without success. That is not right either. 一些批评通货再膨胀的人士表示，这种政策的效力太过强大，最终会适得其反。他们预计的结果是资本外逃、日元崩盘和恶性通胀。这种结果是有可能出现的，但绝非不可避免。如果日本央行 (BoJ)真能神奇地化通缩为通胀，那么它也有不小的可能控制住通胀。还有一些批评人士认为，这种政策毫无效力。他们的观点是，日本多年来一直在大举印钞，却没有取得任何成果。这种观点也是不正确的。
Under Masaaki Shirakawa, who stepped down as BoJ governor this month, the central bank made only token efforts to expand its balance sheet. Mr Shirakawa was a firm believer that Japan’s deflation was structural and could not be fixed by monetary means. Even under his predecessor, Toshihiko Fukui, the BoJ’s pursuit of quantitative easing from 2003 to 2006 was not all it seemed. In that period, the bank took a cautiously incremental approach, a far cry from Haruhiko Kuroda’s big bang this month, with his pledge to double the monetary base in two years. Japan, then, is trying something radically new. 在上月离职的前行长白川方明( Masaaki Shirakawa)任内，日本央行只是象征性地扩大了一下资产负债表。白川坚信，日本的通缩是结构性的，不可能通过货币手段加以解决。即便是在白川的前任福井俊彦( Toshihiko Fukui)任内，日本央行从 2003年至 2006年推行的定量宽松也不尽如表面上那样激进。在那段时期，日本央行走的是谨慎渐进路线，与这个月黑田东彦( Haruhiko Kuroda)搞出的大动静有天壤之别——黑田承诺，要在两年之内让货币基础翻番。所以说，日本正在尝试某种全新的做法。
One concern expressed by neighbouring countries from China to Australia is that the policy’s only“ transmission mechanism” is via devaluation. Their concerns are partly selfish. They worry that floods of money will leave Japan, pushing down the currency and improving the competitiveness of its exporters. In other words, Japan will simply be stealing growth from others. 从中国到澳大利亚，日本的这些邻国表露出的一个担忧是，该政策的唯一“传导机制”是货币贬值。它们的担忧在某种程度上是出于自身利益的考虑。这些邻国担心，会有大量资金流出日本，从而压低日元汇率、提高该国出口商的竞争力。换言之，日本简直就是在从其他国家窃取增长。
But their observation also stems from doubts about underlying growth prospects in a country with such unpromising demographics. The BoJ is massively ramping up its purchase of Japan government bonds in order to force financial institutions to recycle savings into riskier assets with higher returns. But what if such assets don’ t exist? The worry is that flat or falling demand, coupled with a lack of supply-side reform, will weigh severely against future returns. Lack of opportunities at home could explain why the yen has dropped so precipitously, 20 per cent against the dollar since November. It would also suggest that Shinzo Abe, prime minister, needs to shoot his third arrow– the structural reforms intended to lift Japan’s potential growth rate. 但它们持这种态度的原因还在于，一个人口结构如此没有希望的国家，其潜在增长前景是值得怀疑的。日本央行大幅加大购买日本国债的力度，是为了迫使金融机构将储蓄投向风险更高收益也更高的资产。但如果这类资产不存在呢？人们担心，需求持平或下降，再加上缺少供应面的改革，将严重拖累未来的回报。国内投资机会匮乏或许正是日元汇率大幅下挫的原因——去年 11月以来，日元兑美元下跌了 20%。它还表明，日本首相安倍晋三( Shinzo Abe)需要射出第三支箭，那就是旨在提升日本潜在增长率的结构性改革。
Before that, though, comes the question of whether the world will tolerate Japanese devaluation. Here the signs are not too bad. The International Monetary Fund said this week that complaints about competitive devaluation were“ overdone”. It welcomed Japan’s“ dramatic change” in monetary policy and raised its estimates for growth this year from 1.2 per cent to 1.6 per cent, and next year from 0.7 per cent to 1.4 per cent. Even some Chinese officials have cautiously endorsed Japan’s policy. ( Others have been less accepting with one complaining Japan was using its neighbours as a“ garbage bin”.) Still, the most likely outcome is grudging acceptance of Tokyo’s radical new measures. The world may judge that, even if there are spillover effects, it is better for everyone if Japan can get its economy going again. Tokyo’s monetary pre-emptive strike will be a lot less controversial than Pearl Harbor. And it may actually work. 但在那之前还存在一个问题，即世界是否会容忍日元贬值。这方面的迹象还不算太糟。国际货币基金组织 (IMF)日前表示，有关竞争性贬值的怨言有些“过头了”。 IMF乐见日本“大幅改变”货币政策，并且上调了对日本经济增长的预期，今年的增长率预期从 1.2%上调至 1.6%，明年的增长率预期从 0.7%上调至 1.4%。就连部分中国官员也对日本的政策表示了谨慎支持。（另一些官员则持保留态度，有人抱怨称，日本正把邻国当作“垃圾桶”）。尽管如此，最有可能的结果仍是世界勉强接受日本激进的新举措。国际社会可能会断定，即便存在溢出效应，只要日本能够使其经济恢复增长，最终结果也还是会使所有人受益。日本在货币政策方面发动的先发制人打击，引起的争论将远少于珍珠港事件。而且，这种政策可能真的有效。
